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COMMENTS
URSPRUNG V. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY: THE DUTY
OF AN INSURER TO APPEAL A JUDGMENT IN EXCESS
OF POLICY LIMITS
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Ursprung v. Safeco Insurance
Co.' recently confronted the issue of whether an insurance company's
contractual obligation to defend incorporates a duty to prosecute an
appeal of a judgment in excess of policy limits, which is rendered
against one of its insured. The Court held that the duty to defend
does include an obligation to appeal where there are reasonable
grounds for the appeal. Apart from this, the traditional standard for
measuring a breach of the duty to defend will apply.2
This decision is significant for its potential effect upon a wide
segment of society. The public has increased its use of automobile
liability insurance3 in order to protect itself financially against the
greater number of accidents 4 that have occurred because of an
increasing number of automobiles.5 The standard automobile insurance
policy contains provisions regarding the extent of liability for per-
1497 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1973).
2 The standard used to measure a breach of the duty to defend under an
insurance policy is one of bad faith or fraud. This is the standard which controls
in all the relationships and dealings that fall under the policy terms. 44 Am. Juii.
2d Insurance § 1531 (1969).
3 The amount of money spent on automobile liability insurance coverage was
as follows:
1965-$5,424,000,000
1969-$7,866,000,000
1970-$8,850,000,000
U.S. BuREAU or Ts CENSUS, STATISTIcAL ABSTRAcT OF THE UNrrED STATES 465
(98d ed. 1972).
4 From 1967 through 1971 the number of reported automobile accidents in
the United States was as follows:
1967-13,700,000 accidents
1968-14,600,000
1969-15,500,000
1970-16,000,000
1971-16,300,000 (preliminary figure)
Id. at 551.
5 From 1967 through 1971 the number of new automobiles in the United
States was as follows:
1967- 8,458,000 autos
1968-10,442,000
1969-10,071,000
1970- 8,470,000
1971-11,172,000
Id. at 547.
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sonal injury and for property damage. Nearly always included in
the policy is a clause relating to the insurance company's defense of
any suits against the insured alleging damages for which the policy
provides coverage." These clauses are designed to give the insured
assurance that his contractual rights will be protected. In actual
practice, however, this does not always happen; insurance companies
attempt to minimize their expenses and obligations with respect to
any accident. Consequently, questions of the extent of the liability
coverage and, particularly, of the obligation to defend frequently
arise.
Before Ursprung, this particular issue regarding the scope of the
duty to defend had not been resolved by the Kentucky Court. The
Court surveyed other courts' treatment of the contractual duty to
defend and the standards imposed upon insurance companies under
this duty in arriving at its conclusion that the duty to appeal exists
where reasonable grounds for appeal are present.
The factual situation of Ursprung is rather involved. An auto-
mobile operated by Sherry Ann Clark collided with a motorcycle
operated by James Ursprung, resulting in serious injury to Ursprung.
Evidence indicated that Ursprung was operating his motorcycle with-
out lights. Clark had a $10,000 liability insurance policy with Safeco
Insurance Company, which included a standard defense clause.7
Ursprung sued Clark for $182,500 damages, and pursuant to the
policy defense clause, Safeco employed an attorney to represent her.
The attorney sent the usual excess liability letter s but, upon the advice
of another attorney, Clark decided not to employ additional counsel.
6 The exact language of the duty to defend clauses varies from policy to
policy. The following two clauses are typical:
.. . and the Company shall defend any suit alleging such bodily injury
or property damage and seeking damages which are payable under the
terms of this policy, even if any of the allegations of the suit are ground-
less, false or fauduent; but the Company may make such investigation
and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company Comprehensive Automobile Policy pt. 1,
coverage B.
... to defend, with attorneys selected by and compensated by the com-
pany, any suit against the insured alleging such bodily injury or property
damage and seeking damages which are payable hereunder even if any
of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent; but the
company may make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Policy § 1, coverage B (original emphasis).
7 The wording of this defense clause was: "And Safeco shall defend any suit
alleging such damages which are payable under the terms of this policy, even if
any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fradulent. Ursprung
v. Safeco Ins. Co., 497 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Ky. 1973).
8 The letter advised Clark that because the amount sued for exceeded the
coverage of the policy, she should feel free to employ additional counsel to
represent her interests beyond the insurance policy limits. Id. at 727.
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Prior to the trial neither side in the suit made any effort to settle
the claim within the policy limits or for a sum less than the amount
claimed.9 The action was tried on October 7, 1969, and the jury
delivered a verdict awarding Ursprung $22,969.30. Counsel for Clark
filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new
trial. These motions were overruled.
On January 30, 1970, the insurance company's attorney sent a
letter informing Clark and her attorney that Safeco had decided to
pay the limits of the policy in partial satisfaction of the judgment
rather than appeal. This letter also informed them of an offer by
Ursprung to settle the judgment for $15,000 and advised them that
an appeal must be taken within thirty days of January 15, 1970.
Clark's attorney informed the other attorney that there would be no
appeal as they had made other arrangements to protect Clark. At
no time did Clark or her attorney demand that Safeco appeal the
judgment.
In a later letter Safeco's attorney reiterated the company's decision
not to appeal. He also stated:
' . * I hope the defendant will appeal the judgment in this case,
as I have strongly felt that the court should have directed a verdict
for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law.10
On March 5, in consideration of the agreement of Ursprung to
forgo issuance of an execution against her on the unpaid balance of
the judgment, Clark assigned and transferred to Ursprung any and all
claims, demands, causes of action, or rights she had or might acquire
against Safeco arising out of or by reason of its handling of her
rather than appeal. This letter also informed them of an offer by
defense. On May 11, 1970, Ursprung, as assignee of Clark, filed
against Safeco alleging that Safeco's failure to prosecute an appeal
of the judgment was a breach of its contractual duty to defend. The
suit sought $12,696.30, the amount of the judgment in excess of the
policy liability limits which Safeco had paid." Upon a motion for
summary judgment, the court dismissed with prejudice, stating that
as a matter of law the exhaustion of policy limits relieves the insurance
0id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 728. This suit placed Ursprung in the difficult position of arguing
that the judgment was correct in order to protect his own interests, but that theinsurance company bad a duty to appeal the judgment under its obligation to
defend. The Court, however did not even treat the problems this sort of position
raises. Instead, it focused soFely upon the insurance company's duty to defend.
[Vol 2
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company of any further duty with respect to the policy.' 2 This con-
clusion formed the basic issue of the case before the Court of Appeals.
The lower court in stating its conclusions of law followed one
theory dealing with the duty to defend. This view holds that when
the insurance company has exhausted its coverage, it is under no
further obligation to the insured. Lumbermeifs Mutual Casualty Co.
v. McCarthy,13 a leading case, held that the primary obligation under
the insurance contract is to pay the insured's legal liability for damages
upon certain specified contingencies. The other provisions of the
policy, including the obligation to defend, were designed to implement
the primary obligation. Consequently, the insurance company would
not be required to defend a second suit once it had fulfilled its primary
obligation. Having paid the policy liability limits, the insurance com-
pany was no longer bound by the policy.' 4
Courts which adhere to this theory treat phrases like "any suit,
coming within terms of this policy"15 and "such insurance as is
afforded by this policy"16 as referring to the type and amount of the
coverage.' 7 As generally construed, this obligates the insurance com-
pany to defend suits for which it assumed responsibility for liability
payments under the terms of the policy.' s In Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Mead Corp.,19 a Georgia court looked to the parties' intention
as expressed in the contract language. This case involved Mead Cor-
poration's attempt to recover expenses incurred in the defense of suits
12 The exact wording of the decision was as follows:
1. There is no genuine issue of material fact on the question of bad faith.
Even if supported by evidence, which is totally lacking, the allegation of
negligent failure to settle the claim within policy limits does not state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
2. When policy limits had been exhausted by paying such limits plus
interest and Court costs the Defendant bad no duty to appeal or to take
any further steps with respect to the policy.
Id. The latter holding is of importance here. The Boyle Circuit Court set forth a
concise rule of law defeating Ursprung's claim.
13 8 A.2d 750 (N.H. 1939). The case before the court was upon a petition
for declaratory judgment where plaintiff sought to have its obligations clarified.
McCarthy had an insurance policy with liability limits of $5,000 and a clause pro-
viding for the defense of "any suit, coming within the terms of this policy, seeking
damages on account of....' McCarthy was involved in an auto accident with R.Bull rd, a minor. Theplaintiff defendedMcarthy in a suit by Bullard for personal
injuries andp aid the $5,000 policy limit in settlement of the judgment. Lumber-men's Mutual refused to defend McCarthy in a suit brought by Bullard's father
for loss occasioned by him personally by reason of the injury to his son. The court
stated that the insurance company was not required to defend in the suit broughtby Bullard's father.
'4 Id. at 752.
' Id. at 750.
'e Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mead Corp., 131 S.E.2d 534, 535 (Ga. 1963).
'7 Id. at 536
'
8 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. McCarthy, 8 A.2d 750, 752 (N.H. 1939).
f 1o 1 S.E.2d 534 (Ga. 1963).
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arising out of an automobile accident. Liberty Mutual settled two
claims against Mead out of court, thereby exhausting its policy
liability. Mead then paid amounts in excess of policy limits to fully
satisfy the settled claims; and when Liberty Mutual refused to defend
the company in two remaining suits arising out of the same accident,
Mead provided for its own defense. Reasoning that the covenant to
defend and the covenant for payment of liability must be construed
together, the court denied recovery of defense expenses because the
insurance company had fulfilled its obligations under the policy. The
insurer, thus, completes its contractual obligations when it pays the
full limit of its liability in complete or partial extinguishment of the
insured's liability.
The same reasoning is applied with regard to the duty to appeal.
If the limits of the policy have been paid into the court in partial
satisfaction of a judgment, the insurer has no further duty to defend
and thus, no duty to appeal.20 Once an insurance company's liability
limits are exhausted, there is no further insurance afforded by the
policy which would obligate a defense or appeal.
These cases treat the duty to defend as subordinate to the liability
limits of the policy. However, the courts do not usually permit the
insurer to relieve itself of the obligation to defend suits by simply
paying the policy limits into court before pending actions have been
liquidated or have reached a final judgment.21 To allow the in-
surance company to so pay the policy limits would cast the entire
burden of defense upon the insured.22 If the insurance company
wants this course of action to be available, it should provide for it
in its contract with the insured.23
The Court of Appeals points out in Ursprung that this construction
of policy clauses is a harsh one.24 Instead of treating the liability
clause and defense obligation as indivisible, the Kentucky Court
follows the other major theory which construes the term, "insurance as
20 General Cas. Co. v. Whipple, 828 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1964).
21 Sutton Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rolph, 244 A.2d 186 (N.H. 1968).
22 Contra, Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 237 F. Sup. 860 (S.D. Ind.
1964). The court allowed the insurance company to place the iability funds into
the court through an interpleader and avoid the duty to defend, because the
amount of recovery sought was so far in excess of the liability coverage. To avoid
the bad effects of placing the burden of defense entirely upon the defendant, the
court required the insurance company to place the funds into the court uncon-
ditionally and with no right to defend in order to defeat the claims and no right to
the funds even if the insured were held not liable.
23 Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. McCarthy, 8 A.2d 750, 752 (N.H.
1939).
24 Specifically, the Court says that the interpretation is "... an extremely
harsh construction and in many instances will, in the course of litigation, leave the
insured without adequate or any protection." 497 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Ky. 1973).
[Vol. 62
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afforded," as descriptive of the type of coverage afforded by the
policy.25 American Employers Insurance Co. v. Goble Aircraft Special-
ties, Inc.26 is a leading case which holds that the clause setting out
the obligation to defend is entirely independent of the clause relating
to the extent of liability. In that case, the insurance company was
required to defend several suits arising out of one accident because
the duty to defend related to the type of accidents within the scope
of the coverage and not to the amounts of the coverage. The New
York court relied upon the idea that "[t]he duty to defend is broader
than the duty to pay."27 It treated the two clauses as separate and
distinct and reasoned that the obligation to defend was still present
when the suit involved an injury of the type described in the policy,
even though the liability limits had been exhausted.
In American Casualty Co. v. Howard,28 the Fourth Circuit found
that the obligation to defend exists where a suit alleges damages
covered by the policy even though the complaint also seeks relief
clearly outside the scope of the policy. The court stated that the
duty to defend existed even though the amount sought within the
policy limits was inconsiderable compared to the total recovery
sought.2  More importantly, the court stated that the insurance corn-
25 Id.
26 131 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 1954). This was a declaratory judgment suit
in which American Employers sought to have its duty to defend extend only so
far as suits that fell within the monetary limits of the policy. Goble Aircraft, on
the other hand, argued that the insurance company should defend against any
suit arising out of the accident which the policy covered.
27 Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 77 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1948). The
court's discussion in the Goldberg case involved two aspects of the duty to defend.
The policy states a clear duty to defend wvhen the allegations of the complaint may
impose a risk liability upon the insured. It is of no importance whether the
insurer will ultimately be liable because policy limits are exhausted or because the
suit is decided under a claim for which coverage does not extend. The insurance
company's duty to defend arose from the allegations of the complaint. The policy
protects the insured against lawsuits which upon their face constitute a risk against
which the insurance was taken.
This reasoning would also be appropriate in the cases involved. The fact that
liability limits have been exhausted in no way affects the allegations in the com-
plaint. The insurance company's duty to defend depends upon the complaint,
and not on whether it is ultimately liable to pay.
28 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951). The applicable portion of this case was an
appeal from a federal district court's ruling that the insurance company was liable
for expenses incurred in the defense of a second suit arising out of an accident.
The company had previously defended the insured in a suit, and the judgment in
that suit exhausted the policy limits. The plaintiff sought $25 000 damages for the
pain and suffering endured by Roberts before his death. The relief sought here
was not within the terms of the policy. Later the plaintiff amended the com-
plaint to include a claim for property damage which was within the $5,000
property damage liability coverage. The inclusion of the claim for recovery of
property damage activated the insurance company's duty to defend.
29 In reaching this conclusion, the court followed the general rule that the
insurer's duty to defend is determined by the allegations of the complaint rather
(Continued on next page)
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pany could not just offer to pay for damages up to policy limits
and escape the responsibility of defending the action. The policy
included a defense clause upon which the insured had relied. This
case broadly construes the duty to defend and strongly asserts the
independence of the two clauses. To support its view, the court
quoted the district court judge's opinion that "[t]he two obligations
are assumed in different paragraphs of the contract and under dis-
tinctive subheads,"30 thus relying on the physical placement of the
duties within the contract as effective evidence that they are to be
applied independently.
Courts make their evaluation of the extent of the clause outlining
the duty to defend in light of the contractual nature of insurance
policies. It is assumed that the bargaining process and terms of the
policy result in benefits to both parties. The insurer wants to control
the defense of any suit arising under the policy,31 and the duty to
defend clause achieves this end while providing for the cooperation
of the insured with regard to any suit arising under the policy. By
the terms of the standard liability policy the insured agrees to allow
the insurance company to select an attorney to handle the defense of
suits arising under the policy. However, the insured may also obtain
separate counsel to ensure that his legal rights beyond the insurance
policy are protected. In exchange for relinquishing his right to
completely control the defense,32 the insured receives the insurer's
promise to defend suits whenever there is a threat of liability based on
claims that come within the policy.33
The general rule in interpreting contracts is to give the words and
phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. If ambiguity exists, then
the ambiguous language must be construed against the author,3 4 which
in the case of an insurance policy is the insurer. The policies involved
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
than the actual circumstances of the incident upon which the suit is based. 14
G. COUCH, INSURANCE § 51:40 (2d ed. 1965). The mere allegation of damages
within the policy coverage is the triggering mechanism for the insurance company's
duty to defend.30 American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322, 327 (4th Cir. 1951).
31 The control of the defense by the insurance company is of benefit to it in
several ways. First, it allows the insurer to provide an adequate defense in order
to minimize any judgment against the insured and thus often lessen the amount
the insurance company will have to pay. Secondly, the insurance company is able
to limit the claims that fall within the policy coverage so as to again minimize
its costs. Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance
Policy, 114 U. PENN. L. REv. 734 (1966).
32 Insurance policies, supra note 6.
33 Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy,
supra note 31, at 748.3 4 American Casualty Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 1951).
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in the cases considered above included clauses such as this one con-
tained in the Safeco Policy: "'. .. shall defend any suit alleging such
damages which are payable under the terms of this policy. . . ."'35
This language is clear and without restriction. "[U]nder an unlimited
agreement to do so, the insurance company assumes the expense of all
the components of a proper defense. 8 6 If the insurance company
wishes to limit its duty to defend to suits arising while it still owes
liability under the policy limits, it must expressly state this in the
policy. Otherwise, as in the clauses here, the language shows an
unlimited duty to defend.37
Of course, the courts often consider factors extrinsic to the con-
tract, because it is not always possible to elicit the parties' intentions
merely from the words of the contract. The insurance company does
not intend to assume the defense of every suit alleging injuries
covered by the policy. In fact, the Forms Committee of the National
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters recognized the ambiguity of the
policy language and interpreted the two clauses-the clause setting
out the duty to defend and the clause relative to liability-as de-
pendent and indivisible.38 Any other interpretation, it is argued,
would involve the insurance company in numerous suits in which it
is not an interested party, since its liability limits will have been
exhausted.39 Public policy opposes such a disinterested involvement
because it places control of the case in the hands of one not ultimately
liable.40
The insurer's efforts to deny the duty to defend where policy
limits have been exhausted clearly evidences a lack of intent to be
involved in such a sweeping obligation to defend. In 1955 insurers
35 497 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Ky. 1973).36American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 131
N.Y.S.2d 393, 401 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
371d.
38 The Forms Committee expressed its intention that the "ight of defense
[under insurance policies] . . . is a co-extensive right with the policy limits pro-
vided, and in effect, expires with payment of the full policy obligations." Mont-
gomery, The Effect of Exhausting Policy Limits on the Duty of the. Insurer to
Defend, 1965 INs. L.J. 651, 658.
30 See, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mead, Corp., 131 S.E.2d 534 (Ga. 1963);
American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d 393
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
40 The court in the Lumberman's Mutual case pointed out the public policy
problems inherent in imposing a duty to defend when policy limits have been
exhausted. Public policy is violated by
... placing the duty of defense upon the shoulders of one not obligated
to pay, an in removing control over settlement and litigation from the
hands of the insured who, in the event of a verdit and final judgment
against him would have to pay damages.
8 A.2d 750, 752 (N.H. 1939).
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attempted to limit this duty by changing the wording of standard
policy clauses.41 This language change was intended to bring duty
to defend clauses under the cloak of the introductory paragraph of the
standard policy, which includes a reference to the coverage of the
policy as being subject to the limits of liability.42
So far, few courts have viewed the changes in language as effecting
such a result.43 Because the language is unclear to most courts,
attorneys, and laymen, the courts still look to the terms of the policy
and note the absence of any express qualification on the obligation to
defend. With this in mind, courts consider the insured's perspective
of the insurance policy defense clause and expectations of the pro-
tection afforded.
Most insureds are probably unaware of the full provision of their
policies. However, if the insurance policy is to survive as an enforce-
able contract, courts must assume that the parties bargained over
the provisions and that the insured sought the defense clause. To
focus upon the insured's intent, "... [t]he test to be imposed is one of
reason-that is, whether the defense sought is for a coverage which the
insured desired to purchase and for which he paid premiums."4
Justice Branch's brief dissent in the Lumbermen's Mutual case con-
cisely reflects the implications of construing the clauses as indivisible.45
Such an interpretation renders the exchange made by the parties a
nullity. The insured would be giving up his right to control the
41 The revision in 1955 changed the policy phrase from the pre-1955 language
of "[a]s respects the insurance afforded by the other terms of this policy" to the
post-1955 wording of '[w]ith respect to such insurance as is afforded by this
policy." Montgomery, supra note 88, at 657.
42 John Faude, associate counsel for Aetna Casualty and Surety Company,
commented in a paper before the Section of Insurance Law of the American Bar
Association that the
... 1955 revision contains editorial amendments in the defense insuring
agreement which, while seemingly minor in nature, are designed to make
the defense provision more clearly subordinate to the main introductory
paragraph of the policy, which states the company's entire contractual
undertaking as' subject to the limits of liability, exclusions, conditions and
other terms of the policy."
Faude, The New Standard Automobile Policy: Coverage (Insuring Agreements and
Exclusions), 1955 INS. L.J. 647, 650 (original emphasis).
43 The New Hampshire Supreme Court is one which has viewed the 1955
language change as effecting a Jiriting result upon the defense clause. This is
keeping with its traditional construction of the clauses as closely linked. The
court in Travelers Indem. Co. v. New Enaland Box Co. stated that the policy
".... expressly stipulates that this right and auty is 'with respect to such insurance
as is afforded by this policy' which is the language of the Standard Automobile
Liability Policy as revised in 1955." 157 A.2d 765, 769 (N.H. 1959).
44 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4684 (1962).
45 Justice Branch stated that an interpretation of the clauses as indivisible
. construes the promise . . . to defend not as an undertaldng for the benefit
of the assured, but as a stipulation for the benefit of the insurer." 8 A.2d 750, 753
(N.H. 1939) (Branch, J., dissenting).
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defense, but the benefit of receiving a defense would take effect only
at the insurer's whim, when it would prove beneficial to him. The
principles of contract would not permit such a result.46 Instead, such
a clause must be treated as a bargained-for provision that benefits
both parties. The contractual obligation to defend requires the in-
surance carrier to conduct the whole defense, and "if necessary to
vindicate the rights of the insured, to prosecute an appeal."47 This
duty is only tentative, as the covenant would require an appeal only
where there are reasonable grounds.48 The reasonableness is de-
termined by the particular circumstances of the case; a more exacting
rule regarding the prosecution of an appeal would be impractical.49
This view, that the duty to appeal is effective only when reason-
able grounds for appeal exist, is the most widely adopted rule.
Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co.50 holds
that a contract to defend does not necessarily create an obligation to
appeal. In the proper circumstances, 51 however, a covenant to defend
would effectuate a duty to appeal. Finding that Hawkeye-Security
had not breached its contract by failing to appeal, the court held that
the company would be liable for failure to defend only if it acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. The decision whether an appeal is
46 1 A. CORBIN, CoNrAcrs §§ 121, 122 (1963).47 Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 N.W. 189, 190 (Minn.
1921).4 1 Kaste v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 170 N.Y.S.2d 614 (App. Div.
1958).49 Justice Frank in a concurring opinion in the Kaste case took a stricter view
of this issue. He agreed with the outcome of the case, which held the insurer to
a duty to appeal because there were reasonable grounds for appeal. However, he
would go a step further and make the duty to appeal absolute. He saw nothing
in the insurance contract which conditioned the obligation of the carrier upon the
reasonableness of an appeal or limited the insurer's obligation to supplying a
defense up to and including the trial. The contract terms were specific and
absolute on their face. They must be so construed against the insurer who could
have included limiting language, if he did not desire to assume this obligation. Id.
at 617 (Frank, J. concurring).
50260 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1958). This case involved a suit by Indemnity
Insurance Co. against Hawkeye-Security. Indemnity sought to recover expenses
paid in the prosecution of an appeal of a judgment against Northern Utilities.
Northern Utilities had a liability policy with Hawkeye-Security and an excess
liability policy with Indemnity. Both policies included covenants to defend.
Hawkeye-Security defended in the lower court and refused to make a settlement
within policy limits, upon its attorney's advice that res ipsa loquitur would not
apply. Following the judgment, Hawkeye-Security decided to pay its policy limits
and refused to appeal unless the costs of the appeal were pro-rated against each
insurance company. Indemnity took the appeal and instituted a suit for recovery
of expenses.
51 Proper circumstances would be the existence of reasonable grounds for
appeal. To determine this, the insurance company must consider the rights of all
the parties involved. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 278 N.Y.S.2d 787(App. Div. 1967); Kaste v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 170 N.Y.S.2d 614
App. Div. 1958); see 44 Am. JuR. 2d Insurance § 1552 (1969).
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reasonable must be made by the insurer, and the failure to take the
advice of an attorney is not sufficient grounds to establish bad faith.
Ursprung v. Safeco Insurance Co.5 2 treats the duty to prosecute
an appeal in a similar manner. The Court holds that the contractual
obligation to defend carries an obligation to take an appeal from a
judgment against an insured where reasonable grounds for appeal
exist. This sets forth a relatively absolute standard, but the holding
in this particular case seems incongruous, since the Court does not
really elucidate the means by which it evaluated Safeco's performance
of the contractual obligation to defend. Apparently the Court ap-
plied a dual approach to the question. Initially, it must be determined
whether there were reasonable grounds for appeal.5 3 If such reason-
able grounds existed, then the obligation to defend embraced a duty
to prosecute an appeal. Secondly, although not specified in the
decision, the Court apparently would apply the traditional bad faith
or fraud test to determine if the duty to defend has been breached.
The Ursprung decision is thus unclear on its face. The last sentence
of the opinion54 seems to establish a reasonableness test for the in-
surer's duty to appeal. However, as previously indicated, the actual
test combines reasonableness of appeal and bad faith or fraud in failing
to prosecute a reasonable appeal as a part of the duty to defend.
The facts of Ursprung obscure the holding. The Court says that
reasonable grounds for appeal were lacking in the case, a valid con-
clusion in light of all the circumstances. Ursprung's driving without
lights would be contributory negligence and, as a matter of Kentucky
law, would bar recovery in his suit.55 However, the jury verdict
in favor of Ursprung indicates that this was not the law applied in
the case. Since the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
was overruled, an appeal on this point would normally be the appro-
priate step. The insurance company attorney's comments in his letter
to Clark and her attorney suggest that he believed an appeal to be
appropriate. The crucial factor in deciding whether to appeal, how-
52497 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1973).53 This is a difficult determination to make: the reasonableness of an appeal is
a matter of judgment of the party making the decision. The insurance company's
decision whether there are reasonable grounds for appeal must be made by con-
sidering the rights of all parties (the insurance company, the insured and anyone
else involved) and must be made in good faith. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 278 N.Y.S.2d 787 (App. Div. 1967); Kaste v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 170 N.Y.S.2d 614 (App. Div. 1958); see 44 Am. Jtr.2d Insurance § 1552(1969).
54 "Therefore, the issuer can not be said to have unreasonably failed to take
an appeal." 497 S.W. 726, 731 (Ky. 1973).
55 See Williams v. Chilton, 427 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1968); Skees v. Whitaker,
?98 S.W.2d 715 (Ky. 1965).
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ever, was Clark's attorney's statement to the insurance company that
her rights had been protected.56 From this, the insurance company
concluded that since other steps had already been taken to insure the
protection of Clark's rights, an appeal would not be necessary. The
only benefit derived from such an appeal would be a potentially
lessened judgment which would not necessarily reduce the amount
for which Safeco was responsible. Under these circumstances, Safeco
decided not to appeal, judging that such action would not be
reasonable in the case. The Court agreed; and because reasonable
grounds for appeal were absent, the bad faith or fraud test was not
considered.
An initial reading of the Ursprung case gives the impression that
it is a sound and progressive decision with respect to an insurer's
duty to appeal a decision against an insured. The Court appears to
adopt a reasonableness standard to measure the performance of the
duty to defend. In actuality, the Court adopts a combined standard;
and only through close scrutiny is it possible to decipher the method
the Court followed to arrive at its holding in the case.
Ursprung generally samples the approaches taken by other juris-
dictions. The Court pronounces its adoption of the independent
interpretation of the duty to defend clause without giving a precise
basis of its rationale for the choice. Apparently the Court feels this
view provides equitable protection for both parties.
The lack of the Court's own reasoning for adopting the rule that
an insurer's duty to defend is independent of its duty to pay liability
limits does not diminish the importance of this decision. The holding
sets forth the law in Kentucky and places the state among the more
progressive jurisdictions. The decision protects the interests and
rights of the insured while providing a means for the insurer to
avoid the burden of a broad duty to defend. The insurance company
needs only to include precise language in the policy to spell out
clearly and unambiguously the extent of the duty to defend. The
insured, in order to invoke the duty to appeal, must act reasonably
with respect to the case. The decision in Ursprung should provide a
sound basis for application and growth of Kentucky law.
Damon W. Harrison, fr.
56497 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. 1973).
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